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INTRODUCTION

Private financing of federal election campaigns by individuals, interest
groups, and business entities is a fundamental characteristic of American
electioneering. Candidates depend on the receipt of financial contributions
to supply the resources required to direct an effective campaign. t Accompanying this reliance on large contributions is the danger that such contributions "are given to secure a political quidpro quo from current and potential
office holders."' 2 This ever-present risk of political corruption erodes the in*

B.A., Emory University, 1980; J.D., American University, 1983.

1."The increasing importance of the communications media and sophisticated massmailing and polling operations to effective campaigning make the raising of large sums of
money an ever more essential ingredient of an effective candidacy." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1,26 (1976). Out of the $81.65 million raised by the five leading candidates in the 1980 Presidential race, $80.05 million was spent. This illustrates the candidates' heavy dependence on
their ability to raise money. Wash. Post, Nov. 16, 1981, at A3, col. 1.

2. Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976).
17
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3
tegrity of the American electoral process. To combat these infirmities, Con-4
Act of 1971 (FECA or Act).
Campaign
gress passed the Federal Election
5
Since 1971, Congress has amended the Act three times due to various constitutional violations, ambiguities in statutory interpretation, and enforcement difficulties.
The FECA's major purpose is to limit "the actuality and appearance of
6
corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions." One
manner of achieving this goal is the requirement that candidates, their polit-7
ical committees, and independent contributors file disclosure statements
8
with the Federal Election Commission (FEC or Commission). Such reporting requirements serve a dual purpose. First, they furnish the voter with
information on the source of a given candidate's funds, as well as how he
spends these funds. Second, public access to a candidate's financial record
serves as a deterrent to political quidpro quo. Furthermore, the purpose of the
Act is enhanced by provisions that limit the amount that an individual or
group may contribute.9 There are essentially two ways to finance a campaign privately. Supporters of a candidate can either make direct expenditures for the candidate's benefit, or they can make contributions to others (such
as the candidate himself or his committees), who then spend the money for
the candidate's benefit. Contributions, but not expenditures, by individuals
0
and non-party political committees are limited by the Act.'
The various amendments to the FECA have not fully resolved the difficulties and uncertainties that have hampered the enforcement of its regulatory scheme. The 1980 Presidential and Congressional elections produced

3. Public awareness of political honesty is especially acute in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal. Id. at 27. See also Buckley v. Valco, 519 F.2d 821, 838-40 (D.C. Cir. 1975), a dsn
part and rev'd n part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (extensive discussion of corruption in campaign
financing).
4. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified
as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) and in various sections of 18, 47

U.S.C. ).
5. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263; Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475;
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1980)
(codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) and in various sections of 18, 26, 47

U.S.C.).
6. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976).
7. 2 U.S.C. §§ 432, 434 (Supp. IV 1980). This section of the Act requires candidates and
their political committees to file detailed reports of their receipts and expenditures. 2 U.S.C.
§ 434(a) (Supp. IV 1980). Every person who is neither a candidate nor a political committee
and who makes independent expenditures expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate, in an aggregate amount in excess of $250 during a calendar year,
shall file a statement with the Commission. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(17), 434(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
8. The enforcing body of the FECA is the Federal Election Commission. The Commission was established by the 1974 amendments. 2 U.S.C. § 437c (Supp. IV 1980). In addition to
overseeing the entire regulatory scheme, the Commission may also recommend legislation, issue
advisory opinions, subpoena witnesses and information for the furtherance of its investigations,
and pursue both civil and criminal violations of the Act in the appropriate forum.
notes 117, 128-30 and accom9. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a-441b (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Se infra
panying text for a discussion of the contribution limits and their applicability to the note case.
10. The Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), held that expenditure
ceilings were unconstitutional. See infranotes 37-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Buckley decision. But f 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1976), which prohibits electoral expenditures by
corporations or labor organizations. This provision was not at issue in Buckler.

19821

DRAFT-CANDIDATE COMMITTEES

an overwhelming amount of litigation.II One of the more significant disputes arising from the 1980 elections posed the question of whether draftcandidate committees were subject to the jurisdiction of the FEC. A draftcandidate committee is a group whose intent and goal is to convince a candidate to enter an election campaign. Such a committee can support either a
single candidate or multiple candidates. It seeks to achieve its goals through
the raising and spending of money solicited from individuals, clubs, unions,
political action committees, and anywhere else it can find people sympathetic to its cause. The most distinguishing feature of a draft committee is
that it supports an undeclared candidate who has disavowed its support. In
order for such a group to be subject to the FECA's contribution ceilings, it
must be defined as a political committee under the Act.1 2 Draft committees
claim that they are not "political committees" and are, therefore, outside of
the contribution ceilings imposed by the FECA. The FEC is of the opinion
that draft committees are political committees and are thereby subject to the
Act's reporting and contribution provisions. The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 197913 brought draft committees within the reporting requirements of the Act. Thus, draft committees are now required
to disclose their contribution and expenditure activities.1 4 The amendment
is silent, however, as to limits on the amount of contributions a draft committee can receive.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision in Federal Election
Commission v. Machihists Non-Partisan PoliticalLeague1 5 (MNPL) hinged upon
interpretation of the term "political committee" and its application to draft
committees. In MiNPL the Carter-Mondale Campaign Committee, Inc.
(Carter-Mondale) alleged that MNPL, a registered multi-candidate political
committee, had violated the Act by making excessive contributions to draft
6
committees espousing the candidacy of Senator Edward M. Kennedy.'
MNPL argued that draft committees were not subject to the contribution
limits of the Act, because they were not "political committees" under the
11. See, e.g., California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981); FEC v. Citizens for
Democratic Alternatives in 1980, 655 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); FEC
v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897
(1981); In re Carter-Mondale Reelection Comm., Inc., 642 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1980); FEC v.
Central Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1980); Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 591 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1979); FEC v. Phillips Publishing, Inc., 517 F.
Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1981); Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980),aft'rper
cunam, 455 U.S. 129 (1982); Reader's Digest Ass'n v. FEC, 509 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
FEC v. Florida for Kennedy Comm., 492 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. Fla. 1980), rev'd, 681 F.2d 1281
(Ilth Cir. 1982); Common Cause v. FEC, 489 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1980); Republican Nat'l
Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y.), a~f'dsummari/y, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
12. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1976). See ifra notes 47-60 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the definition given to political committees.
13. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat.
1339 (1980) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (Supp. IV 1980) and in various sections of 18, 26, 47
U.S.C.).
14. H.R. REP. No. 422, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprntedin 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 2860, 2874. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
15. 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). The court did not incorporate the 1980 amendments of the FECA into its decision as the facts of MNPL transpired before
the amendment became operative.
16. Id at 383. See in/fa notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
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term's definition in the FECA. 17 The FEC asserted that it did have jurisdiction over draft-candidate committees. The Commission issued a sweeping
subpoena to further its investigation of the violations alleged in the CarterMondale complaint. 18 MNPL, maintaining its position that draft committees were not covered by the Act's provisions, refused to comply with the
subpoena.' 9 The FEC then filed a petition in the district court to enforce
the subpoena. 20 MNPL appealed after the district court ordered compliance
with the FEC subpoena.
Prior courts had refused to decide the jurisdiction question, declaring it
improper to raise jurisdictional issues in an action to enforce the Commission's subpoena. 2 ' These courts held that subpoena enforcement proceedings were of a limited nature, and thus, were not to extend beyond the
enforcement issue. In MNPL, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
reached a contrary result, holding that the FEC's subpoena and investigajurisdiction, and therefore
tion exceeded the Commission's subject matter
22
vacated the lower court's enforcement order.
This article discusses and analyzes the significance of the court's decision in this novel area. The history of the FECA is presented, particularly
regarding its relationship with draft committees. The issues of agency subpoena enforcement and the first amendment right of political association are
also fully detailed. The article concludes by scrutinizing the ramifications of
the court's unprecedented decision and the resulting loophole created in the
FECA.
I.

PRIOR LEGAL HISTORY

The following discussion will review federal election law, necessary to
an understanding of MNPL, and will present an overview of draft committees and their treatment under the FECA. An examination of a federal
agency's power to investigate, and to issue and enforce subpoenas is also
17. See tnfra note 117.
18. 655 F.2d at 384. The Commission's power to issue and request enforcement of subpoenas is provided in 2 U.S.C. § 437d (Supp. IV 1980). See infia notes 132-37 and accompanying
text.
19. 655 F.2d at 384.
20. Id See 2 U.S.C. § 437d(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
21. See FEC v. Florida for Kennedy Comm., 492 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. Fla. 1980), rev d, 681
F.2d 1281 (11th Cir. 1982) (although the court found some support for the proposition that a
draft committee is not a political committee, and therefore not within the scope of the FECA,
the court held that the issue of the Act's "coverage" could not be decided at the subpoena
enforcement stage). Butsee FEC v. Wisconsin Democrats for Change in 1980, Order No. 80-C124 (W.D. Wisc. Apr. 24, 1980) (the district court found that subject matter jurisdiction did
exist and thus the subpoena was within the Commission's authority). See infra notes 61-66 and
accompanying text for a discussion of these two draft Kennedy cases. See also United States v.
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) (administrative subpoenas may be broad in nature);
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (purpose of subpoena is to
procure evidence, not to prove a charge); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501
(1943) (issue of coverage of the Act was not for the district court, but for the Secretary of Labor
to decide). See infra notes 78-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of agency subpoena
enforcement.
22. 655 F.2d at 382.
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presented. Finally, the impact of the first amendment right of political association as it relates to compelled disclosure of information will be discussed.
A.

The Hslo~y of the FECA

The Constitution expressly grants Congress the power to regulate the
elections of members of the House of Representatives and Senate. 23 The
Supreme Court has acknowledged that "the function contemplated by Article I, section 4, is that of making laws."- 24 Congress broad power to regulate
Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections is also recognized by the
25
Court.
A traditional concern in American politics is the prevention of corruption in elections. 26 Congress has attempted to prevent such abuses by enacting reporting and disclosure requirements. The seminal federal disclosure
law, the Act of June 25, 1910,27 required committees that influenced congressional elections in two or more states to report all expenditures and contributions, as well as the identity of the recipients or contributors of those
funds. It further required a person to report his expenditures if he spent
more than $50 in a year for the purpose of influencing a congressional election in more than one state and if the expenditure was not made through a
political committee. 28 The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 considerably broadened the disclosure requirements. 29 Congress again maintained
that corruption was the justification for requiring the disclosure of the political activities of individuals. 30 Political committees were defined as organizations "which [accept] contributions or [make] expenditures for the purpose
of influencing or attempting to influence the election of candidates or presidential and vice-presidential electors (1) in two or more States, or (2) . . . [as
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1, provides that "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to
the Places of chusing Senators."
24. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1931). In Smey, the Court stated that among the
functions Congress has in regulating elections is the "prevention of fraud and corrupt practices." Id. This is the precise compelling interest that justified the contribution limitations in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 661 (1884) (Congress
has wide supervisory role over entire range of election law).
25. "The power of Congress to protect the election of President and Vice-President from
corruption being clear, the choice of means to that end presents a question primarily addressed
to the judgement of Congress." Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547 (1934). See also
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 85-109 (1976); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (Congress
has authority to change voting age in federal elections).
26. See, e.g., FEC v. MNPL, 655 F.2d 380, 388-89 n. 17 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897
(1981).
27. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822 (1910). For a general discussion of history of
federal election disclosure law, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1976); United States v.
UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957). See also Redish, Campaign Spending Laws and the First Amendment, 46
N.Y.U. L. REV. 900 (1971).
28. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822, 822-24 (1910).
29. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tit. III, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (current
version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). Although the FECA of 1971 repealed the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, many provisions of the Corrupt Practices Act were incorporated into the FECA.
30. See 65 CONG. REC. 9507-08 (1924) (statements of Sen. Robinson).
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a] subsidiary of a national committee." 3 ' The committees were required to
report total contributions and expenditures, including the names and addresses of each person who contributed $100 or more or who received $10 or
more in a calendar year. 32 In Burroughs v. United States,3 3 the Supreme Court
upheld the Corrupt Practices Act stating that Congress had the "power to
pass appropriate legislation to safeguard . . .an election from the improper
34
use of money to influence the result . . .
The next major piece of legislation was the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971.'5 The FECA has been amended three times since its inception. 36 The most rigorous changes occurred pursuant to the 1976 Supreme
Court decision in Buckley v. Valeo .37 Because Buckl is the source of authority in most federal election litigation, 38 a brief examination of the opinion is
39
appropriate.
Generally, the Court in Buckl struck down the FECA's expenditure
limitations but upheld the Act's contribution ceilings and disclosure requirements. 4° The Court used an "exacting" level of scrutiny to provide the
broadest protection for the first amendment rights of free political expression
and association. 4 ' The Court stated that expenditure limits "reduce[d] the
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the
depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is
because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money."' 4 2 By contrast, a limit on the
amount of a contribution "entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication . . . . [I]t permits the
31. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, § 302(c), 43 Stat. 1070, 1070 (1925).
32. Id at § 305.
33. 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
34. Id at 545. See Birnbaum, The Consttutitnality Of The Federal Corrupt Practices Act After
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 28 AM. U.L. REV. 149 (1979) (overall discussion of the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act, its effectiveness and constitutionality, with emphasis on the Act's
effect on corporate political activity).
35. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980) and in various sections of 18, 26, 47 U.S.C.).
36. See supra note 5.
37. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
38. See, e.g., California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981); FEC v. Central Long
Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1980); Common Cause v.
Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'dper curiam, 455 U.S. 129 (1982).
39. See generaly Clagett & Bolton, Buckley v. Valeo, Its Aftermath, And Its Prospects. The
Constitutiona/iy of Government Restraints on Political Campaign Financing, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1327
(1976); Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitutionah'ty of the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 323 (1977); Comment, Buckley v. Valeo: The Supreme
Court and Federal Campaign Reform, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 852 (1976).
40. See supra text accompanying note 10. The suit in Buckley was brought by various candidates, incumbent officials who sought re-election, potential contributors, political committees,
and numerous party organizations. 424 U.S. at 7-8. The complaint sought an injunction
against enforcement of the major provisions of the Act, as well as a declaratory judgment that
its provisions were unconstitutional. Id at 8-9. The appellants claimed that a limitation on the
"use of money for political purposes constitute[d] a restriction on communication violative of
the First Amendment," since money is essential for effective political communication. .d at 11.
Additionally, the appellants argued that the disclosure and reporting requirements of the Act
"unconstitutionally impinged on their right to freedom of association." Id.
41. Id at 16.
42. Id at 19.
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symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in
any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues." 43 Thus, although both ceilings affect first amendment rights, the contribution limitations do not encroach as seriously upon protected political
44
expression or association.
The Act's primary purpose, limiting "the actuality and appearance of
corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions," was
enough to justify contribution limits. 45 The corruption justification was insufficient, however, to permit expenditure ceilings, since the Court felt that
4+i
the danger of corruption through unlimited expenditure was minimal.
The language of the Act 4 7 appears to incorporate as political committees a nearly unlimited range of issue-oriented groups. 48 The Court in Buckley, however, recognizing the dangers of a broad definition, sharply limited
the scope of the term "political committee."
To fulfill the purposes of the Act [the definition of political com43. Id at 20-21.
44. Id at 23. The contribution ceilings still permit the joint participation of individuals to
form independent political committees (such as MNPL). Such committees, through the combined efforts of individual contributions, have the ability to exert substantial political influence.
Id at 28 n.31.
45. Id at 26. The Court found it unnecessary to consider two other proposed justifications
for the contribution limitations-neutralizing the voices of affluent groups and persons, and
reducing the skyrocketing costs of election campaigns. Id. at 25-26.
46. Id. at 46-47. "While the independent expenditure ceiling fails to serve any substantial
governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process, it heavily burdens core First Amendment expression." Id at 47-48.
The Court also disposed of the argument that the removal of the expenditure limits would
hamper the overall regulatory scheme by pointing out that expenditures "controlled by or coordinated with" the candidate or his campaign are treated as contributions under the Act and, as
such, are subject to the contribution limits. Id at 46-47.
47. The relevant terms of the Act at the time of the litigation are defined below. Although
these provisions have since been amended, the changes would not affect the outcome of the
issues discussed here.
"IP]olitical committee" means any committee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives contributions or makes expenditures during a calendar year in an
aggregate amount exceeding $1,000;
"[C]ontribution"(1) means a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of
value made for the purpose of(A) influencing the nominationfor election, or election, of any person to Federal office
• •

, or

(B) influencing the result of an election held for the expression of a preference
for the nomination of persons for election to the office of President of the United
States. ..
"[E]xpenditure"(1) means a purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money
or anything of value, madefor the purpose of(A) inluencig the nom'nationfor election, or the election, of any persons to Federal
office . . . .or

(B) influencing the results of a primary election...
2 U.S.C. § 43 1(d), (e), (f) (1976) (amended 1980) (emphasis added).
48. In United States v. National Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1972),
the court expressed its fears that a liberal interpretation of the Act's provisions would discourage
many groups from organizing and expressing their viewpoints. Under this liberal interpretation
"every little Audubon Society chapter would be a 'political committee,' for 'environment' . ...
[A] Boy Scout troop advertising for membership to combat 'juvenile delinquency' or a Golden
Age Club promoting 'senior citizens' rights' would fall under the Act." Id at 1142. See infia
note 51 and accompanying text.
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mittees] need only encompass organizations that are under the control of a
candidate or the major purpose of which i's the nomination or election of a
candidate. Expenditures of candidates and of "political committees" so construed can be assumed to fall within the core area
sought to be addressed
by Congress. They are, by definition, cam49
paign related.
The Court in Buckley believed that a less restrictive definition would be "im50
permissibly broad."
In reaching this definition, the Court relied on two lower court decisions. 51 In UnitedStates v. National Committeefor Impeachment,52 the Committee
published an advertisement, five months before the Presidential election,
calling for the impeachment of President Nixon because of his Vietnam policies. The advertisement declared that the Committee would support any
candidate for election to the House of Representatives who would back the
impeachment drive. 53 The government asserted that the Committee was a
political committee, since it was trying to influence the outcome of the Presidential election through the advertisement and the contributions requested.
The Second Circuit interpreted the Act's language "made for the purpose of
influencing" 54 "to mean an expenditure made with the authorization or consent, express or implied, or under the control, direct or indirect, of a candidate or his agents."' 55 The court also "construe[d] the Act to apply only to
committees soliciting contributions or making expenditures the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of candidates." ' 56 The court,
therefore, held the Committee to be outside of the narrow definition of polit57
ical committee.
The National Committeefor Impeachment interpretation of political committee was followed in ACLU v. Jenings,58 where an advertisement was published which deprecated President Nixon's position on busing. 59 The court
inJennings was in "full agreement" with the National Committeefor Impeachment
interpretation, because it successfully circumvented potential first amend60
ment infirmities in the Act.
Regulation of federal elections has been reshaped frequently. The
FECA has undergone these changes through congressional amendments and
judicial interpretations. The term "political committee" is one term that the
49. 424 U.S. at 79 (emphasis added).
50. Id at 79-80.
51. United States v. National Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1972);
ACLU v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973) (three-judge court), oacatedasmoot sub nom.,
Staats v. ACLU, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975).
52. 469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1972).
53. Id. at 1136-38.
54. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 301(e), (f), 86 Stat. 3,
11-12 (1972) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 431(8), (9) (Supp. IV 1980)).
55. 469 F.2d at 1141.
56. Id. The court declared that the government's construction of the Act was incompatible
with the first amendment right to free expression. Id at 1142.
57. Id. at 1140-41.
58. 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973) (three-judge court), vacatedas moot sub nom., Staats v.
ACLU, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975).
59. 366 F. Supp. at 1042-44.
60. Id at 1057.
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courts have construed. The Supreme Court's narrow definition of political
committees in Buckley restricts the scope of groups and committees that are
subject to regulation under FECA.
B.

Draft-CandidateCommittees

Draft-candidate committees have only recently become a conspicuous
factor in the campaign process. Due to their brief history, draft committees
had been the subject of litigation on only two prior occasions at the time of
the MNPL decision. 6 ' These cases entailed an unprecedented assertion by
the FEC of subject matter jurisdiction over draft committees for the purpose
of enforcing subpoenas. Both involved draft committees which were attempting to convince Senator Edward M. Kennedy to enter the 1980 Presidential campaign.
In FEC v. Flondafor Kennedy Committee (FFKC),"2 the district court implied the FEC probably lacked subject matter jurisdiction over draft committees. 63 Nonetheless, the court held it was precluded from considering the
4
issue of subject matter jurisdiction in a subpoena enforcement proceeding."
In FEC v. Wsconsih Democratsfor Change in 1980,65 the court addressed the
issue of coverage, and found that "on its face" the subject matter of the
subpoena was within the agency's authority and therefore enforceable."" Because no court has directly addressed the issue of FEC jurisdiction over draft
groups, examination of prior draft-candidate cases does not aid in determining whether the FEC has such jurisdiction.
Legislative activity provides more aid in ascertaining whether Congress
intended the Act to cover draft committees. The Act itself is devoid of any
explicit draft committee language. Additionally, no mention of draft committees existed in the Act's legislative history until consideration of the 1980
amendments. 67 Congressional discussion of contribution and expenditure
ceilings for political committees consistently refers to these limitations as
they relate to the campaign of a particular candidate. 68 The absence of any
681 F.2d
61. FEC v. Florida for Kennedy Comm., 492 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. Fla. 1980), rev'd,
1281 (11 th Cir. 1982); FEC v. Wisconsin Democrats for Change in 1980, No. 80-C-124 (W.D.
Wisc. Apr. 24, 1980). Both cases involved committees named in the Carter-Mondale complaint
issued to MNPL.
62. 492 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. Fla. 1980), rev'd, 681 F.2d 1281 (11 th Cir. 1982). The reversal in
this case was handed down on Aug. 2, 1982. In reaching its conclusion that the FEC had no
jurisdiction to investigate the FFKC, the Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on MNPL, indicating
"substantial" agreement with that opinion. 681 F.2d at 1282.
63. The district court believed judicial authority generally supported the proposition that
the term "political committee" is limited to a group whose major purpose is the nomination or
election of a candidate. 492 F. Supp. at 595 & n. 12 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79
(1976); United States v. National Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135, 1141 (2d Cir. 1972);
ACLU v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041, 1057 (D.D.C. 1973)).
64. The FFKC court cited as its authority Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186 (1946). Under Oklahoma Press, statutory coverage does not have to be demonstrated
before an investigation can proceed.
65. No. 80-C-124 (W.D. Wisc. Apr. 24, 1980).
66. Id, slip op. at 4-5.
67. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
68. Set H.R. REP. No. 1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57-58 (1976). See also H.R. REP. No.
1239, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974) (limits applicable only to expenditures related to a "clearly
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discussion of draft committees by Congress suggests it did not intend that the
Act cover draft committees.
The FEC itself sheds more light on the FECA's coverage of draft committees. Through advisory opinions6 9 the Commission is able to render its
views on a number of issues. The FEC has sought to bring draft committees
within the definition of political committee. Advisory Opinion 1979-26 contains the initial response to pre-candidacy activities. 70 The Commission
stated that an individual should be able to "test the waters" to determine the
feasibility of possible candidacy without being subject to contribution limitations. Exploratory groups, formed for that purpose, therefore, were not
political committees. The Commission also stated, however, that a candidate could not amass campaign funds through these means before declaring
candidacy; rather, funds contributed were available only to ascertain polit7
ical support for a potential candidacy through activities such as polling. 1
In Advisory Opinion 1979-40,72 the Florida for Kennedy Committee
(FFKC) requested an opinion regarding the applicability of the Act's contribution and expenditure limits. Although the Commission found that Senator Kennedy was not a candidate, it nevertheless held the FFKC subject to
the Act's provisions, thereby limiting the amount a person or political com73
mittee could contribute to FFKC to $5000.
The Commission, in its annual reports, has repeatedly suggested that
74
draft committees be incorporated into the political committee definition.
The annual report is submitted to Congress and contains the Commission's
legislative recommendations. Since 1975, the FEC has recommended that
Congress make both the reporting and contribution provisions applicable to
draft groups. 75 The extensive amendments in 1976 did not affect draft committees. In 1980, however, in response to the Commission's continued urging, Congress made the Act's reporting provisions applicable to draft
groups. 76 The 1980 amendments did not deal with contribution ceilings for
identified candidate"); S. REP. No. 229, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1971) (reporting requirements
would be required by "every [political] committee supporting a candidate.") (supplemental
views of Senators Prouty, Cooper, and Scott).
69. 2 U.S.C. § 437f (Supp. IV 1982); 11 C.F.R. § 112 (1982) (authorizes the Commission to
issue advisory opinions). An advisory opinion is an interpretation of the law without any binding legal affect. It is issued by the Commission upon the request of an interested party.
70. FEC Advisory Opinion 1979-26, 1 FED. ELECTION CAMP. FIN. GUIDE (CCH) 5408
(June 18, 1979). Rep. Grassley of Iowa questioned whether "exploratory committees," whose
purpose was to determine the viability of becoming a candidate, were subject to contribution
limits.

71. Id. at 2. It can be said that a draft committee, like an exploratory committee, attempts
to "feel out" the public and convince a candidate to run by showing him the extent of his public
support. Both groups deal solely with the pre-candidacy stage.
72.

FEC Advisory Opinion 1979-40, 1 FED. ELECTION CAMP. FIN. GUIDE (CCH) $ 5425

(Aug. 17, 1979).
73. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(C) (1976). See also FEC Advisory Opinion 1979-49,
I FED. ELECTION CAMP. FIN. GUIDE (CCH) 5433 (Oct. 5, 1979) (Commission affirmed Advisory Opinion 1979-40).
74. See 1975-1980 FEC ANN. REP.

75. Brief in Opposition of Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, Respondent at 15-16,
FEC v. MNPL, 454 U.S. 897 (1981) (cert. denied).
76. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, § 104, 93
Stat. 1339, 1348 (1980) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434 (Supp. IV 1980)). "The change was made to
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draft groups in any way. Most recently, the Commission has submitted a
legislative recommendation which would require draft groups to comply
with the contribution and expenditure provisions of the Act in the same
77
fashion as political committees.
The recent development of draft committees has coincided with efforts
by the Commission to stunt the growth of these committees. As draft groups
have become more influential, the FEC has increasingly sought jurisdiction
over them. Congress thus far has refused to comply fully with the Commission's request. The legislature has had ample opportunity, to incorporate
draft groups into the Act but has done so in only a limited manner. Congressional silence, prior to 1980, should not be construed as an intention to
incorporate draft committees in the Act.
C.

FederalAgency Power of Investigation and Subpoena Enforcement

When conducting investigations into possible violations of the law,
many federal agencies have the authority to subpoena information for the
purpose of aiding their inquiry. 78 The FECA authorizes the FEC to issue
subpoenas 79 and permits the Commission to seek enforcement through the
district court if the subpoenaed party refuses to comply.8 0 These subpoenas
may compel disclosure of various records, documents, and membership lists,
all of which tend to be of a personal nature. 8 ' Such disclosure may not be
compelled, however, if it will chill the free exercise of political expression and
association protected by the first amendment. 8 2 Before a subpoena is enforced, a district court must consider the extent to which it will require demonstration by the issuing agency of statutory jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the investigation. It is in this context that subpoena enforcement
requests are examined.
Agencies involved in regulating corporate and business matters have initiated most subpoena enforcement litigation. In these areas, the Supreme
Court has granted wide deference to agency requests. The Court's decision
ensure that organizations set up to 'draft' individuals who are not actually candidates will be
required to report." H.R. REP. No. 96-422, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, repr'ntedin 1979 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2860, 2874. These amendments became effective after the draft-Kennedy
activities and are therefore inapplicable in MNPL.
77. Letter from Mr. John McGarry, Chairman of the FEC, to Mr. Charles Mathias, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration (Aug. 21, 1981). The proposal
would amend the Act to cover contributions and expenditures made "for the purpose of influencing a clearly identified individual to seek nomination for election.
Id (emphasis
added).
78. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1976); Securities and Exchange
Commission, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1976); Internal Revenue Service, 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1976); Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 209 (1976).
79. 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(3), (4) (Supp. IV 1980).
80. 2 U.S.C. § 437d(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
81. For contents of requested subpoena in MNPL, see tnfra note 135 and accompanying
text.

82. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.

Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 245 (1957). See
rnfta notes 101-12 and accompanying text for discussion of first amendment protections from
compelled disclosure.
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in Untied States v. Morton Salt Co. 8' furnished the test used to ascertain the
viability of a requested subpoena. This test is designed to narrow the issues
that may be litigated at a subpoena enforcement proceeding to whether the
agency has the statutory authorty to undertake the investigation and obtain
the information sought. The subpoena is enforceable if "the inquiry is
within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the
information sought is reasonably relevant." 84 The utilization of the Morton
Salt test usually results in a district court's "rubber stamp" enforcement of
85
the subpoena.
In addition, during subpoena enforcement proceedings, most courts refuse to consider jurisdictional or substantive defenses which might be raised
against an administrative complaint. 8" These courts believe that to do
otherwise would severely hamper agency investigations. This rationale has
been applied to FEC investigations as well. The Fifth Circuit, in FederalElection Commission v.Lance, 8 7 explicitly adopted the Morton Salt framework in
challenges to an FEC subpoena during an enforcement proceedrejecting
ing. 88 In FEC v. Floridafor Kennedy Committee,8 9 an FEC subpoena of a draft83. 338 U.S. 632 (1950). In Morton Salt, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had required various corporations to file reports demonstrating whether they had complied with a
lower court's cease and desist order, as well as with other FTC regulations. Id at 634. Morton
Salt, along with the other respondents, objected to the FTC's jurisdiction and subsequently
declined to supply the information demanded. Id at 637. In formulating the test the Court
relied heavily on Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946). See also
Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943). (subpoena issued by Secretary of Labor should be enforced unless information sought was "plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any
lawful purpose of the Secretary . . . ." Id

at 509).

For a general overview of the history of federal agency subpoena enforcement litigation see
I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 4 (2d ed. 1978).
84. 338 U.S. at 652. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964) (subpoena must
have legitimate purpose and must be relevant to that purpose); FEC v. Lance, 617 F.2d 365 (5th
Cir. 1980) (court's role in subpoena enforcement proceeding is a limited one), a 'din part, rev'din
part on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir.) (en banc),cert denied, 453 U.S. 917 (1981). See also
SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071
(1979); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 873 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974
(1977); Federal Maritime Comm'n"v. Port of Seattle, 521 F.2d 431, 434-35 (9th Cir. 1975); SEC
v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188, 189 (7th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d
1047, 1052-53 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974); Adams v. FTC, 296 F.2d 861, 866
(8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 864 (1962).
85. See, e.g., FTC v. Carter, 636 F.2d 781, 785-87 (D.C. Cir. 1980); FTC v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp., 626 F.2d 966, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1980); SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d
1018, 1023-24, 1032-33 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979). But see, e.g., CAB v.
United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1976); Montship Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime
Bd., 295 F.2d 147 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
86. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 213 (1946); Endicott
Johnson Corp v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943); FEC v. Lance, 617 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1980),
afd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 453 U.S.
917 (1981); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 879 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
974 (1977); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Port of Seattle, 521 F.2d 431, 434-35 (9th Cir. 1975);
SEC v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188, 189 (7th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480
F.2d 1047, 1052-53 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974); Adams v. FTC, 296 F.2d 861,
866 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 864 (1962).
87. 617 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1980), afdinpart,rev'd in part on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1132 (5th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 917 (1981).
88. 617 F.2d at 369. The court also cited Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186 (1946), and Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
89. 492 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. Fla. 1980), rev'd, 681 F.2d 1281 (1 1th Cir. 1982). See supra notes
64-65 and accompanying text.
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candidate committee was enforced by the district court without hearing coverage objections.
A number of cases place limits on judicial enforcement of subpoenas.90
9
In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Wallihng, ' a case consistently cited as supporting broad judicial subpoena enforcement, the Supreme Court concluded
its discussion with restraining language. 92 The Court also recognized that
many essential issues, ordinarily decided by an agency's administrator,
93
The district court
should be carefully reviewed by the district court.
"should not become a mere rubber stamp for the approval of arbitrary action by an administrative agency." ' 94 Opinions recognizing the limited judicial role in subpoena enforcement proceedings, preface their decisions with
95
Inthe assurance that the investigation is within the agency's jurisdiction.
deed, the Morton Salt test has been held subject to exceptions where a "patent
96
lack of jurisdiction" is evident.
These judicial limitations have been similarly applied to the investiga97
tory authority of the FEC. In Jones o. Unknown Agents of the FEC, the District of Columbia Circuit found the Commission's inquiry power to be broad
but not limitless. 98 The court required that the Commission's investigation
99
These
"bear some possible relation to [its] responsibilities under the Act."
parameters apply not only to the FEC's statutory authority to undertake an
investigation, but also to the scope of its examination.1°°
The Morton Salt test provides federal agencies, such as the FEC, with a
means for obtaining enforcement of their subpoena demands. The test's insubstantial requirements, combined with the district court's refusal to permit
90. See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); FTC v. Carter,
636 F.2d 781, 785-87 (D.C. Cir. 1980); FTC v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 626 F.2d 966,
974 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Appeal of FTC Line of Business Report Litigation, 595 F.2d 685, 702-03
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 958 (1978); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 872 (D.C. Cir.)
(en bane), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977).
91. 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
92. "Persons from whom [the administrator] seeks relevant information are not required to
submit to his demand, if in any respect it is unreasonable or overreaches the authority Congress has gien."
Id at 217 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 216-17. "The issues of authority to conduct the investigation, relevancy of the
materials sought and breadth of the demand are neither minor nor ministerial matters." Id at
217 n.57.
94. Id. at 216 n.56 (quoting General Tobacco & Grocery Co. v. Fleming, 125 F.2d 596, 599
(6th Cir. 1942)).
95. These cases are in the business regulation context. See, e.g., United States v. Morton
Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); FTC v. Carter, 636 F.2d 781, 785-87 (D.C. Cir. 1980); FTC
v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 626 F.2d 966, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1980); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555
F.2d 862, 872 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. dented, 431 U.S. 974 (1977).
96. CAB v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 591 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
97. 613 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Jones, a contributor to the campaign of a candidate
under investigation, was questioned at his home by agents of the FEC. Id. at 868-69. Jones was
questioned about various personal matters, including his political beliefs and affiliations. Id
The court held that the investigation itself was not objectionable, but that questions about
political beliefs are unrelated to legitimate investigations and beyond the FEC's authority. Id.
at 873.
98. Id at 872.
99. Id
100. Id. Cf FEC v. Central Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45 (2d
Cir. 1980) (court refused to enforce provisions of FECA where Act's provisions were inapplicable to defendant's activities).
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substantive defenses addressed to the merits of the agency's potential complaint, usually result in compulsory enforcement by the district court. This
is especially true with subpoenas of a corporate or business nature where
overbreadth of the subpoena is the only effective check placed upon an
agency.
D. First Amendment Rights of PoliticalAssoczation
Once the district court has enforced an agency's subpoena, the subpoenaed party is required to disclose the requested information. Compelled
disclosure itself can violate first amendment protections.' 0°
An essential
function of the first amendment is to protect "free discussion of governmental affairs . . .including discussions of candidates."' 1 2 The compelled disclosure of the activities of a political group, such as a draft-Kennedy
committee, may violate this basic constitutional freedom.' 0 3 The constitutional importance given to associational rights stems from the Court's recognition that group association unquestionably enhances the ability of
individuals to express their point of view. 104 In order to protect this essential
constitutional right, the Court has subjected forced disclosure requests, in
the context of political association, to the closest scrutiny possible.' 0 5 The
inherent dangers of compelled disclosure are particularly acute in the con06
text of political campaigns. '
To satisfy this intense level of scrutiny, the Supreme Court has demanded that the state's subordinating interest be compelling. 0 7 Buckley also
requires that the government's interest must bear a "relevant correlation" or
a "substantial relation" to the information being requested.' 0 8 This strict
101. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976). See also Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960);
NAACP v. Alabama ex relPatterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
102. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957) (first amendment should assure uninhibited interchange of political and social
ideas).
103. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). Because of the political nature of an FEC investigation,
liberal subpoena enforcement becomes distinctly more dangerous than the enforcement of other
business-related agencies' subpoenas.
104. NAACP v. Alabama ex relPatterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). The Court has most
recently reiterated this point in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,
295 (1981).
105. NAACP v. Alabama ex ret Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958). See also Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) ("exacting scrutiny").
106. The Court in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971), explicitly declared
that the first amendment constitutional guarantee has "its fullest and most urgent application
precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office."
107. NAACP v. Alabama cx rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958). See also Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Common Cause v.
Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980), aJ'dper curiam, 455 U.S. 129 (1982).
108. 424 U.S. at 64; see alsoGibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524
(1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex relPatterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
Following Buckle, courts have consistently applied a strict level of scrutiny when construing election law regulation of freedom of association and expression. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of
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scrutiny test, first established in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 10 9 can be
met by a showing of sufficiently important government interests. 110 The
Court in Buckley, in fact, held that the FECA disclosure requirements successfully met this exacting level of scrutiny.' It The Court, however, placed
restrictions on its holding. To demonstrate a compelling state interest, the
FEC must first show that the disclosing individual or group falls within the
Act's jurisdiction.
As a consequence, in subpoena enforcement proceedings, the first
amendment issue may be avoided by a statutory construction holding the
FECA's reporting provisions were not intended to encompass the party requested to report. If the Act does not cover the individual or group in question, there is no need to inquire into first amendment violations; the Act is
simply inapplicable. If the individual or group is within the jurisdiction of
the FEC, a compelling interest for the subpoenaed information then must be
shown. Circumstances may exist where the first amendment infringement is
so great, and the state's interest in requiring disclosure so slight, that application of the Act's provisions could not pass constitutional muster.112 The potentially "chilling effect" of a compelled disclosure on first amendment rights
becomes a factor to be weighed by a court in construing the coverage of the
Act in an FEC subpoena enforcement proceeding.
II.
A.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF

FEC v.MNPL

The Draft-Kennedy Committees' Activites Prior to Commencement of the
Commission's lnvestigaton

The conflict in MNPL involved varying interpretations of the status of
the draft-Kennedy committees under the FECA. 113 The MNPL was the separate segregated fund'1 4 of the International Association of Machinists
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C.
1980), afd per curiam, 455 U.S. 129 (1982).
109. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
110. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 97 (1961) (the
state's showing of sufficiently important government interests is especially significant where the
"free functioning of our national institutions" is threatened).
111. 424 U.S. at 66-68. The Court found three categories that justified the Act's reporting
requirements. First, disclosure would provide voters information on where campaign finances
come from and how they are spent, thereby helping create a more educated voting public. H.R.
REP. No. 564, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (197 1). Second, public exposure of the sources of contributions and expenditures would deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption.
S. REP. No. 689, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974). Finally, the compilation of records through
disclosure would help detect possible violations of contribution limits. 424 U.S. at 67-68.
112. "There could well be a case ...
where the threat to the exercise of First Amendment
rights is so serious and the state interest furthered by disclosure so insubstantial that the Act's
requirements cannot be constitutionally applied." Bucktey, 424 U.S. at 71 (1976). See, e.g., Bates
v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958); Doe v. Martin, 404 F. Supp. 753 (D.D.C. 1975).
113. 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). The detailed facts of MfNPL
were not disputed by the parties.
114. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1976). Separate segregated funds are established by corporations, labor organizations (such as the IAM), or membership organizations for the purpose of
soliciting political contributions from their members. Any separate segregated fund established
under 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) is defined as a political committee. I I C.F.R. § 100.5(b) (1982).
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(IAM), t" 5 and was registered with the FEC as a multi-candidate political
committee."I 6 The FEC concluded that MNPL's contributions to the draftKennedy committees were subject to the contribution limits of the Act,, 17
because the draft-Kennedy committees were "political committees" within
the meaning of the Act. The MNPL, on the other hand, contended the draft
committees were "engaged only in pre-candidacy activities" and that the
FEC lacked jurisdiction over such activities." 8
The IAM first voiced its disenchantment with the policies of President
Carter, whom it had supported in the 1976 Presidential election, 19 in September 1978. 1AM President William W. Winpisinger sharply criticized the
President during a speech evaluating Carter's administration. 1 20 A few
115. The IAM promotes itself as an organization emphasizing support for "friends of labor." Its political arm is the MNPL. The IAM has traditionally supported Democratic candidates, but does not always adhere to the party line. The IAM is the third largest labor
organization in the United States, consisting of approximately 879,000 members, ranking only
behind the AFL-CIO and UAW. See Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280, 30506 (S.D.N.Y.) (Appendix "A"), affd summarily, 445 U.S. 955 (1980) (discussing advantages of
labor organization support under the FECA).
116. 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (Supp. IV 1980); 11 C.F.R. 100.5(e)(3) (1982). A multi-candidate
committee is a registered political committee that "has received contributions for Federal elections from more than 50 persons" and "has made contributions to 5 or more Federal candidates." Id
117. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1976), provides in pertinent part that:
(a)(1) No person shall make contributions(A) to any candidate and his authorized political committees with respect to
any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed $1,000;
(B) to the political committees established and maintained by a national political party, which are not the authorized political committees of any candidate, in
any calendar year which, in the aggregate, exceed $20,000; or
(C) to any other political committee in any calendar year which, in the aggregate, exceed $5,000.
(2) No multi-candidate political committee shall make contributions(A) to any candidate and his authorized political committees with respect to
any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed $5,000;
(B) to the political committees established and maintained by a national political party, which are not the authorized political committees of any candidate, in
any calendar year, which, in the aggregate, exceed $15,000; or
(C) to any other political committee in any calendar year which in the aggregate exceed $5,000
(3) No individual shall make contributions aggregating more than $25,000 in any
calendar year ...
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1), (2), (3) (1976). See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976) (amended 1980) (contribution
limitations applicable to banks, corporations, and labor organizations); see infra notes 128-30
and accompanying text.
The Commission concluded that the MNPL "is not only subject to the contribution limitations of 2 U.S.C. § 441a, but also to the restrictions of 2 U.S.C. § 441b as to any of its activities
in connection with federal elections." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3 n.2, FEC v. MNPL,
454 U.S. 897 (1981) (cert. denied).
118. Brief in Opposition of Machinists Non-Partisan Political League at 6, FEC v. MNPL,
454 U.S. 897 (1981) (cert. denied).
119. The branches of the IAM spent an estimated $151,358 for support of Carter's election
and $199,541 for voter registration and get-out-the-vote drive in 1976. Republican Nat'l
Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280, 305-06 (S.D.N.Y.) (Appendix "A"), aJf'dsummarily, 445 U.S.
955 (1980).
120. Winpisinger stated in part:
President Carter has abandoned his constituency, his party's platform, and his own
campaign pledges. Carter may be the best Republican President since Herbert Hoover. Look at his record.
President Carter-to me-is through. He is a weak, vascillating [sic] and ineffective
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weeks later, Winpisinger proclaimed that Carter "does not merit our support, because he has abandoned his party's principles, platform, campaign
pledges and the constituency which put him in office."' 2 1 President Carter,
however, maintained those policies that were unpopular with the IAM. By
February 1979, the IAM and MNPL began forming draft-Kennedy groups
throughout the nation. 1 2 2 The alleged goal of these groups was to convince
Senator Edward M. Kennedy to become a Presidential candidate.' 23 Between May 1979 and the time when Senator Kennedy declared his candidacy in early November, the MNPL gave approximately $30,000 to draftKennedy groups in seven states. 124 During this time, after the MNPL had
made its draft-Kennedy contributions and before Kennedy formally declared his candidacy, the Carter-Mondale Campaign Committee filed a
125
complaint with the FEC against MNPL.
B.

The FEC's Investigation of the Draft-Kennedy Committees

The Carter-Mondale complaint alleged that nine draft-Kennedy committees' 26 were in violation of various provisions of the FECA. 127 Specifically, it alleged: (1) that these nine draft committees were "political
committee(s)" as the FECA defines that term, 128 (2) that the nine named
President. I know as well as anyone, that those are dangerous words. I know how easy
it is for an incumbent-sitting president to launch some spectacular and recoup his
image almost overnight. This guy had the opportunity to become a fresh, young
leader with a resolve and a drive to lead this country out of the Nixon/Ford aftermath.
dented, 454 U.S. 897
Brief for Appellant at 6-7, FEC v. MNPL, 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
(1981).
121. Id. at 7.
122. Id Early draft-Kennedy groups were formed in Iowa, Illinois, and Florida. By late
summer 1979, New Hampshire, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Hawaii also had received donations
from MNPL. Id.at 7-10.
123. Id at 8. The purpose of the draft-Kennedy groups was elaborated in Winpisinger's
"National Call for Kennedy" letter, which the draft committees distributed during 1979. The
letter stated that "you and I simply must find a way to convince Senator Edward Kennedy to
run for the Presidency next year," and that the committees will have achieved their goal once
Kennedy announced his candidacy. Upon achieving this desired goal, the committees would
terminate their existence. Id
124. Id. at 7. See supra note 122.
125. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (1976) (amended 1980). Any individual or group who believes a
violation of the Act has occurred may file a complaint with the Commission. 2 U.S.C.
§ 437g(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). Once the complaint is received, the Commission may commence
an investigation of the charged party only if it has "reason to believe" that a violation has
occurred or is about to occur. Id at § 437g(a)(2).
126. The nine draft committees were: Florida for Kennedy Committee; New Hampshire
Democrats for Change; Democrats for Change in 1980; National Call for Kennedy; Illinois
Citizens for Kennedy; Committee for Alternatives to Democratic Presidential Candidate; Minnesotans for a Democratic Alternative; D.C. Committee for a Democratic Alternative; and Citizens for a Democratic Alternative in 1980. Brief for Appellee at 3 n.2, FEC v. MNPL, 655 F.2d
380 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
127. MNPL, 655 F.2d at 383.
128. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(d) (1976) (amended 1980). If the draft committees were determined
to be political committees under the Act, then the MNPL contributions to them would be
subject to various provisions of the FECA. See infra notes 176-89 and accompanying text. Most
important, MNPL and the draft committees would be required to comply with the contribution
limitations provided in 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1976). See supra note 117.
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29
and theredraft committees were affiliated within the meaning of the Act,'
13 :0
and
limitation,
contribution
$5,000
a
single
to
subject
fore all were
the
violating
thereby
limit,
contribution
this
exceeded
had
(3) that MNPL
Act. The Carter-Mondale complaint expressly declined to give its opinion on
whether Senator Kennedy had become a "candidate" for the purposes of the
Act. 13
Based on the Carter-Mondale complaint, the FEC found "reason to believe"' 3 2 that MNPL had violated certain provisions of the Act. 'I On No:4
vember 5, 1979, the FEC issued a "sweeping subpoena" to MNPL,' '
requesting all materials and documents made in connection with any com5
munication between MNPL and the draft-Kennedy groups.'" The subpoena also ordered MNPL to "provide a list ofevery oficial, employee, stafmember,
and volunteer of the organization, along with their respective telephone numbers." t:113
MNPL moved to quash the subpoena for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
but the FEC denied the motion on November 27, 1979.137 MNPL contin-

129. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(5) (1976); 11 C.F.R. § 110.3(a)(1)(ii)(D) (1982).
If political committees are held to be affiliated, then all such affiliated political committees
are treated as a single "political committee" for the purpose of contribution limitations. Thus,
individuals would be prohibited from making contributions in the aggregate in excess of $5,000
to the entire group of affiliated "political committees." If political committees are held to be
unaffiliated, then individuals may contribute up to $5,000 to each, up to a total of $25,000.
Additionally, if political committees are found to be unaffiliated, a multicandidate political
committee, such as MNPL, may give up to $5,000 to each political committee. But if the committees are affiliated, a multi-candidate political committee can contribute only $5,000 to the
whole group. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1976). Thus, there is a considerable financial advantage to a
candidate who obtains the support of unaffiliated political committees. See Wash. Post, Sept.
16, 1979, at AI, A4, col. 1.
130. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(I)(C), (a)(2)(C) (1976).
131. MNL, 655 F.2d at 383.
132. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (2) (1976) (amended 1980); see supra note 124.
133. The FEC stated that it had "reason to believe" that:
[B]y contributing, in aggregate, in excess of $5,000 in a calendar year to [various draftKennedy committees] MNPL may have violated 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(C). The Commission has determined that these committees, among others, may be affiliated within
the meaning of the Act and the Commission's regulations and that, if affiliated, contributions to them must be aggregated for purpose of the limitations set forth in 2 U.S.C.
§ 441 a(a) (2) (C).
Letter from William C. Oldaker, General Counsel of the FEC, to Howard F. Dow, SecretaryTreasurer of the MNPL (Oct. 19, 1979), quotedin MNPL, 655 F.2d at 383.
134. See 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(3), (4) (1976) (amended 1980) (provides FEC power to issue
subpoenas).
135. MNPL, 655 F.2d at 384. The subpoena also requested:
All documents and materials (including but not limited to minutes, notes, memoranda, or records of telephone conversations) relating to meetings, discussions, correspondence, or other internal communications whereby the MNPL or any of its
committees or sub-units determined to support or oppose any individual in any way
for nomination or election to the office of President in 1980.
Id
136. Id (emphasis in original). The extreme broadness and delicate nature of the subpoena
became an essential factor in the appellate court's decision to require a showing of subject matterjurisdiction by the FEC before court enforcement of the subpoena. See nfra notes 166-72 and
accompanying text.
137. Brief for Appellee, supra note 126, at 5-6 and Brief for Appellant at 19-20, FEC U.
MNPL, 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). (Commission decided to
postpone all decisions regarding subject matter jurisdiction until investigation of MNPL was
completed). See II C.F.R. § 111.6 (1982). See atso, 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(3), (4) (1976); I1 C.F.R.
§ 111.13 (1982).
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ued to refuse to comply with the subpoena.
C.

The District Court Proceedings

The FEC then filed suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia to force MNPL to comply with its subpoena. 138 MNPL objected on the
grounds that the FEC lacked jurisdiction over the subject of the inquiry and
that the Commission must demonstrate a compelling need for the materials
sought because of the sensitive first amendment nature of the materials. The
Commission, according to MNPL, could not demonstrate the requisite need
to obtain information concerning the draft-committee activities at issue.' 3 9
The district court enforced the FEC's subpoena demand in late January
1980, holding that MNPL's jurisdictional objections could not be properly
heard in a subpoena enforcement proceeding.' 40 Applying the test established in UnitedStates v. Morton Salt Co. ,
the court stated that three requirements must be satisfied in order to enforce the subpoena. First, "the inquiry
must be made within the authority of the agency."' 42 The court stated that
"lilt was just this type of matter that caused Congress to set the whole machinery in motion when it enacted the statute."' 14: The inquiry, therefore,
was within the FEC's authority. Second, the demand may not be too indefinite. Here, the court found that because of the very nature of the subject
matter, the sweeping character of the subpoena was as restrictive as possible.' 44 Finally, the materials sought must be "reasonably relevant." The
district court found that the information was necessary for the Commission
to carry out its duties under the Act.' 4' The district court additionally rejected MNPL's first amendment objections, giving minimal consideration to
the issue. 146
III.

THE CIRCUIT COURT'S ANALYSIS IN

FEC v. MNPL

The analysis in MNPL extends beyond that in any previous draft-committee litigation. 47 In earlier subpoena enforcement proceedings involving
138. 2 U.S.C. § 437d(b) (1976) (upon petition by the Commission, the district court may
require compliance with a subpoena issued by the FEC if the subpoenaed party refused to
adhere to the Commission's demand).
139. Brief for Appellant, supra note 137, at 21-22.
140. For the text of the district court's opinion and order see Joint Appendix at 13-17, FEC
v. MNPL, 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir.), cer. denzed, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
141. 338 U.S. 632 (1950). See supra notes 76-100 and accompanying text.
142. Joint Appendix, supra note 140, at 13.
143. Id at 13-14.
144. Id. at 14.
145. Id
146. Id
147. Another case concerning draft committees, FEC v. Citizens for Democratic Alternatives in 1980, 655 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981), was decided the same
day as MNPL. Like MNPL, Citizens for Democratic Alternatives in 1980 (CDA) was an organization which advocated Senator Kennedy's entrance into the Presidential campaign. The
CDA was alleged to have received contributions in violation of the Act. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a),
(0 (1976). The court found no distinctions between the issues raised in the cases and held in
FECv. CDA, as in MNPL, that the CDA was not subject to the Act's provisions, thereby making
the subpoena unenforceable.
The CDA was formed in August 1979 by individuals who sought an alternative to Presi-
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draft groups, the district courts had refused to hear jurisdictional arguments. 148 Unlike these earlier cases, MNPL was decided on jurisdictional
merits rather than purely subpoena enforcement grounds. The court refused
to restrict itself to the Morton Salt 149 test, which is customarily employed to
"rubber stamp" judicial enforcement of federal agency subpoena
150
requests.
The court divided its issue analysis into two prongs. The first prong
examined whether the district court should have determined if there was
subject matter jurisdiction for the Commission's investigation before it enforced the subpoena.'' The circuit court held that such determination was
necessary. The second prong called for an evaluation of whether the FEC
actually had the requisite subject matter jurisdiction, to conduct the
investigation. 152
A.

Standardsfor JudicialEnforcement of the FEC Subpoena

In the first prong the court analyzed the appropriate standards for judicial enforcement of an FEC subpoena. The Morton Salt test was cited as
providing the criteria previously used in enforcing subpoenas of a commercial or corporate character.l: The court in MNPL also presented the applicable limitations to the Morton Salt analysis. 154 Such limitations exist when
there is a "patent lack of jurisdiction,"' 1 5 or where an agency overreaches
the authority granted by Congress. -6 The court went on to list four factors
which made it especially important for a court to assure itself that the FEC
investigation was within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Commission
57
before lending its authority to enforce the subpoena.
First, the court stated that the FEC's investigation of the draft-Kennedy
groups denoted an unprecedented assertion of subject matter jurisdiction
over draft committees. 15 8 The court declared that "extra-careful scrutiny"
should be used because of this untried extension of FEC investigatory audent Carter in the 1980 Presidential election. Brief in Opposition of Citizens for Democratic
Alternatives in 1980 at 3, FEC v. CDA, 454 U.S. 897 (1981) (cert. denied). The CDA received
some funding; however, its main activity was the compilation and distribution of a weekly newsletter which was sent to groups and individuals sympathetic to CDA's draft-Kennedy views. Id
Once Senator Kennedy announced his candidacy, the CDA disbanded. Id at 4.
148. See FEC v. Florida for Kennedy Comm., 492 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. Fla. 1980), rev'd, 681
F.2d 1281 (11 th Cir. 1982); FEC v. Wisconsin Democrats for Change in 1980, No. 80-C-124
(W.D.. Wisc. Apr. 24, 1980); see supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 78-100 and accompanying text.
151. 655 F.2d at 384.
152. Id.
153. 1d at 385. For a full discussion of judicial enforcement of agency subpoenas, see supra
notes 78-100 and accompanying text.
154. 655 F.2d at 385-86.
155. Id at 386 (quoting CAB v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 591 F.2d 951, 952
(D.C. Cir. 1979)).
156. 655 F.2d at 386 (quoting Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 217
(1946)).
157. 655 F.2d at 386-90.
158. Id at 386. The two other cases on draft-candidate committees were subpoena enforcement proceedings against the same draft-Kennedy Committees involved in MNPL. FEC v.
Florida for Kennedy Comm., 492 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. Fla. 1980), rev'd, 681 F.2d 1281 (1 Ith Cir.
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thority. I' 9 The investigative domain of the FEC was distinguished from
investigative functions of other agencies. Although other agencies administer regulations in the commercial and corporate areas, the FEC's subject
matter extends over individuals and groups "ono'insofar as they act, speak and
associatefor politicalpurposes. "30 It was precisely this contrast in the characteristics of subject matter jurisdiction that was one of the foundations for a
more intensive level of scrutiny.
Second, the court contrasted the scope of investigative authority
61
granted to the FEC with the broad investigatory power of other agencies,1
such as the Federal Trade Commission1 62 or the Securities and Exchange
Commission.'16 3 Because of the corporate and business regulatory functions
of these agencies, the judiciary has permitted them to investigate in a general, roving manner. 164 Such agencies have the ability to commence inquiries on their own initiative. The FEC, however, does not have such liberal
investigative powers. The Commission may only launch an investigation
pursuant to a signed, sworn, and notarized complaint filed by an individual
or group. 165 The severe contrast between the scope of investigatory power of
the FEC and of other agencies supported the requirement that a court assure
itself of statutory jurisdiction before enforcing an FEC subpoena.
The third and most significant reason for demanding careful judicial
scrutiny, was the "delicate nature of the materials demanded in [the FEC's]
broad subpoena."' 66 The first amendment, the court said, was intended to
protect the very subject matter of the subpoena's request." t 7 By enforcing
disclosure of these "delicate materials," the government would obtain
firsthand knowledge of which citizens were contributing to the defeat of the
current administration. The compelled release of such information, therefore, carried a great potential for "chilling" the first amendment guarantees
of free exercise of political speech and association.168
1982); FEC v. Wisconsin Democrats for Change in 1980, Order No. 80-C-124 (W.C. Wisc. Apr.
24, 1980). Both of these decisions enforced the subpoena order.
159. 655 F.2d at 387.
160. Id (emphasis in original). See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431, 441a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
161. 655 F.2d at 387.
162. 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1976).
163. 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1976).
164. An early line of case law sought to restrict agency investigatory powers, often denying
enforcement of subpoenas unless a definite need for the requested materials was shown. Ste, e.g.,
Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936); FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924); Harriman
v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407 (1908). The Court later altered its position by permitting agencies to
conduct "fishing expeditions" for the purpose of merely satisfying their official curiosity. See,
e.g., United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632
(1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Endicott Johnson
Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943). The limited role of subpoena enforcement proceedings
was used to support the roving agency investigations. For general discussion of judicial subpoena enforcement proceeding see I K. DAIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4 (2d ed.
1978); supra notes 78-100 and accompanying text.
165. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(l) (1976) (amended 1980).
166. 655 F.2d at 388.
167. Id "[Plolitical expression and association concerning federal elections and officeholding" are the heart of intended first amendment guarantees. d
168. The court also pointed out that the requested FEC information "isof a fundamentally
different constitutional character" than the commercial or corporate information sought by
SEC or FTC investigations. Id
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The court then reviewed the NAACP v. Alabama ex re. Patterson169 line of
cases which requires the state to show a compelling and subordinating interest before a court will force disclosure of information that would infringe on
first amendment guarantees. 7 0 In its decision, the MNPL court did not require the FEC to demonstrate a compelling interest before it could procure
the information from MNPL. Instead, it assumed arguendo that if statutory
jurisdiction to conduct the investigation could be established, then the FEC
could show a compelling interest for the investigation. If, on the other hand,
the Commission lacked jurisdiction over draft committees, then no compelling interest could possibly exist.' 7 1 Thus, due to the sensitive character of
the requested information, it became even more important for the court to
assure itself that the FEC had jurisdiction to conduct this investigation
72
before the subpoena would be enforced. 1
The fourth and final factor causing the court to examine the jurisdiction
issue closely was that the FEC's claim of jurisdiction over draft-candidate
groups "rest[ed] solely upon a legal interpretation of the statute which [did]
1 73
not depend upon any facts sought to be gleaned through the subpoena.'
The finding of jurisdiction depended purely on a statutory interpretation of
whether draft committees are "political committees" under the FECA. Additional facts obtained through the enforcement of a subpoena would have
74
no bearing on this legal determination. 1
The court in MNPL concluded that the combination of these four factors required a court to assure itself that an FEC investigation was within the
subject matter jurisdiction of the Commission before a subpoena could be
enforced.1 75 The highly deferential attitude espoused in Morton Sall was not
adopted by the MNPL court in this novel political association context. The
next logical step was to determine whether the Commission did, in fact, have
jurisdiction over draft-candidate groups. This was the second prong of the
court's decision.
B.

FECJursdction Over Draft-CandidateGroups

If a draft-candidate group is to come within the strictures of the FECA,
thus conferring FEC jurisdiction, it must fit within the definition of a political committee.' 76 The FEC argued that the draft-Kennedy groups were
169. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See also Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text. These
protections are especially critical in an election setting. See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401
U.S. 265, 272 (1971).
170. 655 F.2d at 389.
171. Id.
172. Id
173. Id at 389-90. The court cited a series of cases from the Seventh Circuit that relax the
Morton Salt and Oklahoma Press rule of "rubber stamp" judicial subpoena enforcement where
"the issue involved is a strictly legal one not involving the agency's expertise or any factual
determinations." Id at 390 n.19 (quoting FTC v. Miller, 549 F.2d 452,460 (7th Cir. 1977)). See
FTC v. Feldman, 532 F.2d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir. 1976); Jewel Cos. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 1155, 115960 (7th Cir. 1970).
174. 655 F.2d at 390.
175. Id.
176. See supra note 47.
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political committees according to the Act's operative terms. 17 7 MNPL, on
the other hand, asserted that none of the groups to which it contributed were
political committees, thereby making the Act's provisions inapplicable to
it. 178

The court in MNPL, relying on Buckl v. Valeo's narrow interpretation
of the term "political committee," 1 79 held draft groups to be outside the
political committee definition.' 0 The Court in Buckley stated that a broader
definition of political committee could subject nearly any group partaking in
issue discussion to the wide-ranging and cumbersome provisions of the
Act.'' The sole justification permitting contribution ceilings to be constitutionally maintained was FECA's aim "to limit the actuality and appearance
of corruption resulting from large financial contributions."' 8 2 The court in
MNPL found that the danger of corruption perpetrated by draft committees
was far from specifically identified, since a draft group's activities are not
related to a declared candidate.18 3 Draft committees are merely trying to
convince an individual to become a candidate; they are not "promoting a
184
candidate" as provided in the Act's definition of "candidate."'
Buckley's limited definition of political committee, adopted in MNPL,
provides that to fulfill the purposes of the Act a group can be a political
committee only if it is "under the control of a candidate or [its] major purpose. . . is the nomination or election of a candidate."'1 5 Since draft committees did not fall within the Buckley Court's limited definition of political
committee under the Act, and since draft groups' potential for corruption
was not specifically identified, the court in MNPL would not grant the FEC
jurisdiction over the draft-Kennedy committees.186
177. 655 F.2d at 390.
178. Id.
179. 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976). See also United States v. National Comm. for Impeachment, 469
F.2d 1135, 1142 (2d Cir. 1972); ACLU v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041, 1055-57 (D.D.C. 1973)
(three-judge court), vacated as moot sub noa., Staats v. ACLU, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975). For a detailed discussion of Buckley's limited definition of political committees see supra notes 47-60 and
accompanying text.
180. 655 F.2d at 390-96.
181. 424 U.S. at 79. See supra note 48.
182. Id at 26. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. The danger of corruption or
appearance of corruption must be actually identified for the Act's limitations to be justified
against first amendment guarantees. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-29.
183. 655 F.2d at 392.
184. Id The FECA specifically defined the term "candidate" in pertinent part as:
[A]n individual who seeks nomination for election, or election, to Federal office,
whether or not such individual is elected, and, for purposes of this paragraph, an individual shall be deemed to seek nomination for election, or election, if he has . . .
(2) received contributions or made expenditures, or has given his consent for any other
person to receive contributions or make expenditures, with a view to bringing about
his nomination for election, or election, to such office ...
2 U.S.C. § 431(b) (1976) (amended 1980).
185. 655 F.2d at 392 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 79 (1976)). The Court in Buckley based its limited definition of political committees on three lower court opinions, Buckley v.
Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), afa in part and rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976);
United States v. National Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1972); ACLU v.
Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973), vaeatedas moot sub noma., Staats v. ACLU, 422 U.S.
1030 (1975). These cases are discussed in MNPL. See MNPL, 655 F.2d at 392-94. For a discussion of the National Committee and jennigs cases see supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
186. 655 F.2d at 392-94.
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An examination of the Act's legislative history added support to the
court's holding in MNPL. The court declined to interpret statutory silence
regarding draft committees as congressional intent to include these groups
within the meaning of the Act. l8 7 Moreover, to construe the definition of
political committees broadly would risk violating the Supreme Court's limited definition given to that term in Buckley. The court noted its duty to
arrive at a result free from constitutional doubts. 81 Due to the lack of any
clear legislative intent to include draft groups under the Act's contribution
limits, the court refused to extend the meaning of the provision, thereby
avoiding any constitutional conflict with the Buckley decision. 18 9
C.

The Court's Conclusion in MNPL

The court concluded that in order to protect first amendment guarantees against unwarranted disclosure, where a "serious and novel question of
the Commission's subject matter jurisdiction is presented,"' 90 the district
court must find subject matter jurisdiction prior to enforcing the Commission's subpoena.' 9 ' Since the FEC lacked the requisite jurisdiction over
92
draft committees, the subpoena could not be enforced.'
The court also approved a previously suggested two-step procedure to
be employed when the Commission needs additional factual information
before a sound jurisdictional decision can be made. 19 3 In Reader's Digest Association v. FEC,'94 a New York district court set out this two-step procedure,
187. Id at 394.
188. Id "It is [the Court's] duty in the interpretation of federal statutes to reach a conclusion which will avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality." Id (quoting Richmond Co. v.
United States, 275 U.S. 331, 346 (1928)). See generalty United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45,
47 (1953); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937); Ashwander v. TVA,
297 U.S. 288, 341, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62
(1932).
189. 655 F.2d at 394. The court in MNPL, citing United States v. National Comm. for
Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135, 1139 (2d Cir. 1972), agreed that the legislative history, prior to
1979, is silent regarding the extent of the definition of political committees, leaving it to the
courts to set the parameters of the definition. 655 F.2d at 394.
The amendments enacted in 1980, according to the court, furnished some insight as to
whether the contribution limits were intended to cover draft groups. In response to continued
FEC requests to establish FEC jurisdiction over draft groups, Congress made the reporting provisions applicable to draft committees. See H. R. REP. No. 422, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 15, reprtied
bn 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2860, 2874 (change was specifically made to require
draft organizations to report). Nonetheless, Congress refused to subject draft committees to the
Act's contribution provisions. Indeed, as the court in MNPL stated, "not even a whisper about
limiting contributions to 'draft' groups has ever been heard in the legislative history of FECA."
655 F.2d at 395. See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
190. 655 F.2d at 396.
191. Id
192. Id
193. Id
194. 509 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Reader's Digest sued to enjoin the FEC from
continuing an investigation into possible violations of the FECA through Reader's Digest's distribution of a computer reenactment of Senator Kennedy's accident at Chappaquiddick. Id at
1211. The reenactment had been commissioned by Reader's Digest in connection with an article on the Chappaquiddick accident. Reader's Digest claimed the article was protected by both
the first amendment and the news story exemption of 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1980),
and that the investigation was therefore outside the FEC's statutory jurisdiction. 509 F. Supp.
at 1212. Section 431(9)(B)(i) exempts from FECA coverage any news story, commentary, or
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the purpose of which is to achieve an appropriate balance between first
95
amendment protections and the agency's need for effective investigations. 1
The first step permits information to be subpoenaed for the purpose of deter96
If, on the basis of this informining whether statutory jurisdiction exists.'
mation, the Commission makes a finding of "probable cause" that it has
jurisdiction to conduct the investigation, then under the second step, the
investigation may be extended to determine whether substantive violations
have taken place.1 97 The MNPL court readily accepted the utilization of the
initial "limited subpoena" for future FEC litigation. 198
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT'S OPINION

An Evaluation of the Court's Rationale in MNPL

The balance between first amendment rights and the public's right to
an informative election process has traditionally been a delicate one.'99 Although the court's holding was essentially one of statutory interpretation, the
constitutional overtones heavily influenced its rationale.
The court's analysis in MNPL was fundamentally sound, since the issues
could not have been scrutinized in any other sequence. If the threshold
question-whether the district court should determine that subject matter jurisdiction existed before enforcing the subpoena-was answered in the negative, then it was senseless to proceed to the succeeding question. In this first
prong, the court initially distinguished administrative subpoenas in a corporate or commercial context from FEC subpoenas in the political associational context. 20 0 After laying this groundwork, the court presented four
characteristics of the Commission's subpoena, which together, required the
district court to assure itself of the FEC's subject matter jurisdiction prior to
20 1
enforcing the subpoena.
The first two factors presented by the court were readily justified. First,
the unprecedented nature of the FEC investigation and the political character of the subpoena supported the requirement that the district court determine the existence of statutory jurisdiction before enforcing the
Commission's subpoena. 20 2 Second, the limited scope of the FEC's investigatory power, as compared to the broad investigatory powers of other ageneditorial distributed by a broadcasting station or publication, unless such facility is owned or
controlled by a candidate, party, or political committee.
195. 509 F. Supp. at 1215; see MNPL, 655 F.2d at 396-97.
196. In Reader's Digest, this preliminary investigation would seek to determine whether the
FECA's statutory exemption is applicable. 509 F. Supp. at 1215. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i)
(Supp. IV 1980).
197. 509 F. Supp. at 1215. The Reader's Dzgest test, as well as MNPL's four factors that
require heightened judicial scrutiny of an FEC investigation during a subpoena enforcement
proceeding, has subsequently been adopted in FEC v. Phillips Publishing, Inc., 517 F. Supp.
1308 (D.D.C. 1981).
198. 655 F.2d at 397.
199. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Court balanced first amendment restrictions on political expression against Act's discouragement of political corruption). See also Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
200. 655 F.2d at 385. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
201. 655 F.2d at 386-90. See supra notes 157-75 and accompanying text.
202. 655 F.2d at 387. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
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cies, also pointed toward the need for ascertaining subject matter jurisdiction
prior to the enforcement of an FEC subpoena.2 0 3 These factors alone, however, did not warrant a departure from past subpoena enforcement practices. 20 4 It was the third factor, the "delicate nature of the materials
demanded," 20 5 that was the most significant reason for requiring scrutiny of
subject matter jurisdiction.
If disclosure of these "delicate materials" would, in fact, infringe upon
first amendment rights of political association, the court must first assure
itself that the Commission has the right to obtain the information. For example, if the subpoena were enforced and subject matter jurisdiction were
subsequently found to be lacking, the disclosing group's rights would have
been violated without any adequate remedy. 20 6 Once the names and materials are disclosed, the judiciary cannot erase that knowledge from the minds
of those who have become privy to the information. Hence, the court appropriately adopted the requirement that a subordinating and compelling state
interest must be shown if compulsory disclosure would infringe on first
amendment guarantees.2 0 7 This interest cannot be shown in the absence of
subject matter jurisdiction.
The final factor-that the jurisdiction issue was a purely legal matter
for which no additional facts were needed-provided another strong reason
for requiring the district court to find subject matter jurisdiction before enforcing the subpoena. 20 The rationale of the preceeding factor is applicable
here. Thus, if there is no need or basis for the subpoenaed material, there is
no reason to risk an unnecessary violation of an individual's constitutional
rights.
In the second prong of its analysis the court in MNPL properly found
draft committees to be outside the sphere of the FECA's contribution restrictions. The court accurately applied the Buckley decision's narrow construction of the term "political committee" 20 9 to find draft committees excluded
from that definition. 21 0 In addition, the court saw the lack of legislative
discussion of draft groups, along with the FEC's efforts to acquire coverage
21
of draft committees, as demonstrating an absence of statutory jurisdiction. '
In conclusion, the court also proposed a means of handling similar problems
203. 655 F.2d at 387. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 78-100 and accompanying text.
205. 655 F.2d at 388.
206. See generally NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
207. 655 F.2d at 389. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
265 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See supra notes 105-112 and accompanying text.
Although the court did not require the FEC to demonstrate a compelling interest, the court
assumed that the Commission could meet this standard if it had jurisdiction over draft groups.
655 F.2d at 389. This assumption was made for the purpose of avoiding discussion of an issue
that would not be reached.
208. 655 F.2d at 389-90.
209. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79.
210. 655 F.2d at 391-94.
211. See supra notes 176-89 and accompanying text.
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in the future 21 2 by adopting the two-step procedure provided in Reader's Di2 13
gest Association v.FEC.
Less than two months after the MNPL decision was handed down, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in FEC v.Phillips
Publishing, Inc. 2'4 applied the MNPL analysis to an FEC subpoena enforcement proceeding. The court in Philhps Pubhshing employed MNPL's four
factors to determine that the FEC's subject matter jurisdiction should be
carefully scrutinized before enforcing the subpoena. 21 5 The district court
further stated that if an enforcing court decides that the FEC requires additional factual information to make a reasonable determination whether jurisdiction exists, then the Reader's Digest two-step procedure may be
employed. 2 16 But the "district court need not permit further investigation
by the FEC if additional factual information is not needed to determine
whether the FEC has jurisdiction. ' 2 17 Phillps Publishing presented an ideal
situation for the application of the MNPL approach to this type of FEC
litigation.
B.

Ramifications of the MNPL Decision

Although the court's analysis in MNPL was legally and logically correct, undesirable consequences in the campaign arena are likely to flow from
the decision. That the opinion was a correct analysis of the statute and case
law simply illustrates the need for strengthening of the FECA. The question
which arises is whethet'such strengthening, through coverage of draft groups
by the FECA, would be constitutionally acceptable under the mandate of
Buckleyv.
If contributions to draft committees continue to go unharnessed, such
groups will play a larger role in upcoming elections. This would defeat the
FEC's past policy of preventing the proliferation of political action commit2 18
tees (PAC's).
212. 655 F.2d at 396-97. See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
213. 509 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
214. 517 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1981). In Philips Puhbhhig, the FEC ordered respondents
to answer interrogatories which were sent to gather information in furtherance of its investigation. Id at 1311. Phillips Publishing refused to comply with the Commission's request, claiming the press exemption of 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1980). Id at 1309-10.
215. 517 F. Supp. at 1311.
216. Id at 1313. It is interesting to note that the Reader's Digest approach is used in reference to the press exemption in both Reader's Digest and Philips Pubhthig. The court in MNPL,
nevertheless, has made it applicable to cases questioning the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in other areas of FEC jurisprudence.
217. Id at 1314 (citing MNPL as authority) (no additional information necessary since press
exemption was applicable on facts before the court).
218. For discussions of FEC policy opposing proliferation of political action committees
(PAC's) see Egan, Affiliation of PohtialAction Committees Underthe AntiproiferattinAmendments to the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 713 (1980); Comment, Independent
Political Committees and the Federal Election Laws, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1981).
PAC's have developed as a means of circumventing the general rule that national banks,
corporations, or labor organizations are prohibited from making any expenditure or contribution to benefit any candidate of a federal primary or general election. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980). Generally, these limitations are avoided by the creation of separate segregated
funds from which the PAC can function. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1976).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:1

Besides merely contravening FEC policies, the MNPL decision will have
a more critical impact. Most significantly, the decision creates a loophole in
the Act's regulatory scheme. As long as a draft committee does not become
formally connected with a candidate, it may receive contributions and spend
money without limitation.2 9 The only regulations presently applicable to
draft groups are the Act's disclosure provisions. 220 These new reporting requirements will not diminish draft groups' future effectiveness in campaign
finance.
Although a regulated political committee cannot accept a contribution
of more than $5,000 from an individual or from a multi-candidate political
committee, a draft group has no such contribution limits. 22 Thus, it is now
beneficial for individuals to delay formal declarations of candidacy as long
as possible. The longer a potential candidate officially stays out of the race,
the more money draft groups will be able to receive and spend to "induce"
that individual to run. 222 This will provide ample opportunity for a large
flow of money to draft committees from both the corporate sector and individuals. An "undeclared" candidate has the potential of building up a substantial financial head start on his "declared" opponent, completely outside
the FECA's reach.
The fact that a draft committee does not have the advice and direction
of a candidate, as compared to a declared candidate's political committee,
will not hamper the draft group's money-raising effort. There are many individuals, well established and trained in political campaign management,
who could be hired to run a draft committee operation while the candidate
himself remains officially detached from any campaign efforts. Moreover,
such campaign managers could easily contact the potential candidate, surreptitiously, and obtain strategic viewpoints regarding operation of the draft
committee. 223 Surely this was not intended in Congress regulatory game
plan.
An amendment to the FECA, designed to alleviate these problems stemming from the MNPL decision, would bring draft committees explicitly
under the contribution ceilings contained in the Act. The MNPL court
rightly expressed constitutional misgivings over a finding that draft committees are covered by the Act, given the lack of unequivocal legislative intent
to effect such coverage and the narrow definition of "political committee" in
Buckey .224

A necessary prelude to a constitutionally viable amendment would be
congressional hearings aimed at exploring in detail the ramifications of the
219. Wash. Post, Oct. 14, 1981, at A5, col. 1. See NAT'L J., Sept. 15, 1979, at 1535.
220. 2 U.S.C. § 434 (Supp. IV 1980).
221. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(I)(C), (a)(2)(C) (1976).
222. The danger of this loophole was recognized by a California federal district court in

Gifford v. Congress, 452 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Cal. 1978). "If the Act did not include unofficial
candidates within its purview, an obvious and enormous loophole would exist." Id at 805.
"For example, a candidate . . . could postpone officially qualifying for office until a large
amount of money had been raised-thereby avoiding many of the Act's . . . requirements." Id
at 805 n.7.
223. Wash. Star, May 22, 1981 at A3, col. I.
224. 655 F.2d at 394.
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MNPL decision and the potential for undermining the purposes of the Act
which those ramifications present. The resulting amendment would be
based upon a finding by Congress that FECA regulation of draft committees
is necessary "to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption," thereby
conforming with the constitutionally sufficient justification for contribution
2 25
limitations adopted in Buckley.
Another requirement expressed in the Buckley opinion is that any government regulations in this area be "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgment of associational freedoms. '2 26 In reaching its definition of
"political committee" the Buckley court specifically reiterated its concern
that the Act not be applied to "groups engaged purely in issue discussion." 227 An amendment to bring draft committees within the compass of
the FECA contribution limits, therefore, should be tightly drawn in carrying
out Congress intention to prevent the appearance or reality of corruption.
Such an amendment should cover those groups whose activities could lead to
financial war chests for undeclared candidates, and should avoid bringing
within its scope groups engaged purely in issue discussion. The draft-Kennedy groups of MNPL should be covered, but the National Committee for
Impeachment 228 or the American Civil Liberties Union 229 should not.
The Court in Buckley was not called upon to interpret the Act in relation to draft committees. The Court did adopt a narrow definition of "political committee," but it also was clear that in adopting this definition it was
giving effect to the "core area sought to be addressed by Congress."' 2 30 A
carefully drafted amendment to the FECA, bringing draft committees
within the contribution limitations in order to avoid the potential of corruption, would pass constitutional muster under Buckley.
The shortcomings in the FECA revealed by the MNPL decision can be
rectified by legislative action, but the MNPL decision may give impetus to
legislative action in quite another direction. A great deal of campaign funding comes from PAC's. 2 3 1 The MNPL decision will result in a vertical
proliferation in the number of PAC's by enabling a single "higher" PAC to
contribute freely to many "lower" draft groups set up by the "higher"
PAC. 2 32 This vertical multiplication will most likely occur in all classes of
225. 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976).
226. Id at 25.
227. Id at 79.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 51-57.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
230. 424 U.S. at 79. See FEC v. Florida for Kennedy Committee, 681 F.2d 1281, 1293 (11 th
Cir. 1982) (Clark, J., dissenting).
231. For example, PAC contributions to the 1980 Presidential and Congressional campaigns
totalled $60.5 million. FEC, Press Release (Aug. 4, 1981).
232. This is precisely what occurred in MNPL. The MNPL is the political arm of the IAM,
a major labor union. To achieve the political aims of the IAM, MNPL set up "lower" draftKennedy groups. The lAM, therefore, could funnel money through the MNPL to any of these
draft-Kennedy committees.
For a discussion of the development and congressional regulation of PACs as well as the
constitutionality of these regulations see Birnbaum, The Constitutionalityof the FederalCorrupt Practires Act Aer First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 28 AM. U.L. REV. 149 (1979); Bolton,
Consttutional Limitations on Restricting Corporate and Union Politial Speech, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 373
(1980); Mager, Past and Present Attempts by Congress and the Courts to Regulate Corporate and Union
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PAC's. Different categories of PAC's traditionally contribute proportionately more to different political parties. For example, labor groups usually
support Democratic candidates because of the Democrats' pro-labor policies;
corporate PAC's often support Republicans because of their business sympathies. 233 Corporate PAC's comprise nearly one-half of all "non-party related" political committees, and out number labor committees nearly four to
234
one.
If all PAC's could contribute free from any FECA regulation, corporate
committees' influence would become insurmountable. Assuming that the
political perspectives of Republicans and business PAC's remained in accord, abolishment of all FECA contribution ceilings would give the Republicans a tremendous advantage. These tempting benefits of unlimited
2 35
and constant
contributions, along with the Act's alleged ineffectiveness
236
have caused many Congressmen, especially Republicans, to
revisions,
consider scrapping the entire Act or, at the very least, cutting the agency's
financing in half.23 7 Such a cut in the FEC budget would complement the
Reagan administration's policy of severe reductions in the federal government. Some Congressmen have recommended the abolishment of the Commission's enforcement powers on the grounds that it has become "ridden
with red tape" and that the election process can be sufficiently protected
from abuse by the Act's disclosure provisions. 238 President Reagan has given
his support to these proposals, provided he can obtain bipartisan backing, so
that it does not appear that only Republicans are assailing the
Czmpaign Contributions and Expenditures in the Election of Federal Offlials, 1976 S. ILL. U.L.J. 338;
Sorauf, Pohiical Parties and PoliticalAction Committees: Two Lift Cycles, 22 ARIz. L. REV. 445
(1980); Comment, Corporate Political Action Committees: Effect of the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1976, 26 CATH. U.L. REv. 756 (1977); Comment, Independent Poltical Committees
and the Federal Election Laws, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1981).

233. For the 1980 Congressional elections, labor PAC's gave $11.4 million to Democratic
candidates as opposed to only $.8 million to Republican contenders. The Republicans received
approximately $5 million more than Democrats from corporate PAC's. FEC, Press Release
(Aug. 10, 1981). In these elections, the Democrats significantly narrowed the edge that the
Republicans enjoyed in contributions from corporate PAC's, while simultaneously maintaining
their traditional margin over Republicans in contributions from labor PACs. Wall St. J., Sept.
25, 1980, at 8, col. I. This division among corporate PAC's helped give the Democrats a lead in
fund-raising from all PAC sources. Id This PAC funding is subject to the FECA's contribution
limitations. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
234. FEC, Press Release (Aug. 4, 1981).
235. The FEC has been regarded as "a toothless watchdog that, through its lack of clear
goals, questionable competence, and minuscule resources, is almost sure to do a poor job of
policing the 1980 election[s]." Bus. WK., May 19, 1980, at 157. The recent changes in the law
have been accused of failing to "drive money out of politics; they just make it easier . . . for
fragmented and single-issue groups to spend funds than for candidates trying to put together a
coalition. It's hard to see how this is anything like a net gain for our political system." Wall St.
J., Aug. 20, 1979, at 12, col. 1. See Wash. Post, June 27, 1981, at At6, col. 1.
236. See supra note 5.

237. Wash. Post, June 18, 1981, at A20, col. 1.
238. N.Y. Times, May 19, 1981, § 2 at 12, col. 5. A further suggestion was made that if the
FEC is in fact dissolved, its record keeping authority should go to either the House or Senate
itself, or to the General Accounting Office. Id. See also Wash. Post, Nov. 21, 1981, at A3, col. 5.
(Republican Party National Chairman Richard Richards urged Congress to remove contribution ceilings on the amount that parties can contribute to individual candidates). But cf Wash.
Post, Nov. 25, 1981, at A4, col. I (Senate Rules Committee attacks Sen. Roger W. Jepsen's
proposal for abolishment of FEC).
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Commission.
The MNPL decision adds support to the mounting dissatisfaction with
the FECA and the FEC. Although the Act's regulatory scheme continues to
receive substantial support, Congress growing disenchantment with the
Commission, the President's willingness to revoke many, if not all, of the
Act's powers, and the judiciary's reluctance to extend the Act, all point toward a possible final day of reckoning for the FECA in the not too distant
future.
V.

CONCLUSION

The MNPL decision provided a logical and effective answer to the novel
issue presented. Although turning away from judicial authority in some respects, the court concluded that in this unprecedented area, the district court
should first determine whether subject matter jurisdiction existed for the
FEC's investigation before enforcing the Commission's subpoena. The court
in MNPL then held that the Commission's investigation of draft groups lacked subject matter jurisdiction since draft groups did not fall within the Act's
political committee definition. Nevertheless, the MNPL court has created a
loophole in the FECA's regulatory scheme. A draft committee now will be
able to receive unlimited contributions for an undeclared candidate, thus
encouraging potential candidates to avoid declaring candidacy until the last
possible moment and adding confusion to an already chaotic campaign process. An amendment to the FECA could close this loophole, but the court's
opinion will add momentum to the growing dissatisfaction with the FEC,
thereby increasing the possibility of repeal or drastic modification of the Act.

239.

Wash. Post, June 18, 1981, at A20, col. I.

